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Introduction 
The emergence of Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) programs in the 1990s has marked 
the shifting in poverty alleviation strategy globally (Sugiyama 2011, pp. 250-251). From 
a state-centered strategy which focuses on basic needs provision for the poor, the current 
poverty alleviation strategy is people-centered, by which the government empowers 
people, promotes opportunity, and maintains social security. Directing cash benefits to 
the targeted households with certain conditionality through CCT programs is considered 
as an effective means in combating poverty (Son 2008, p. 1). Hence, CCTs are currently 
being implemented by at least 63 countries, a dramatic expansion compared to only two 
countries (Brazil and Mexico) in 1997 (World Bank 2015, p. 7).  
On the other hand, the issue of income inequality continues to exist. It implies the 
existence of an issue in the welfare distribution among individuals caused by their 
difference in ability and opportunity. Accordingly, the redistributive character of CCTs 
as a social policy is expected to be able to reduce income inequality (Briere & Rawlings 
2006, p. 6). Against the above background, and by examining Brazil’s practical 
experience in implementing Bolsa Familia program, this paper attempts to: (1) identify 
the features of CCT programs so that they become a social policy instrument which 
effectively reduces inequality and alleviates poverty, and (2) identify the circumstances 
needed to make CCT programs become more successful. This paper argues that CCT 
programs are an effective means in combating poverty and reducing inequality because 
of: (1) their ability to better target the beneficiaries, and (2) their ability to affect the 
behavior of the beneficiaries. In addition, to be more successful, implementation of CCTs 
presupposes a good administrative capacity, an adequate supply side policy, and a well-
defined exit rule.  
The effectiveness of CCT programs  
The advantage of CCTs lies in the existence of ‘two tests’ which have to be passed by the 
beneficiaries. First, there are means tests or proxy means tests which aim to qualify the 
beneficiaries. Means testing is a mechanism to identify the eligible beneficiaries by 
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comparing individuals’ incomes or assets against certain threshold or cut-off point, while 
proxy means test is calculating a proxy to household income by examining the 
household’s data of characteristic and welfare level (Grosh & Baker 1995, pp. 1-4). Most 
of the CCT programs across countries are means-tested or proxy means-tested, even 
though different threshold and means are employed (Fiszbein & Schady 2009, pp. 68-
69). Such tests allow the government to identify and target the poorest households as 
beneficiaries. The process of targeting the beneficiaries implies the role of CCTs as a 
targeted cash transfer program. In addition, the term of ‘targeted’ emphasizes the key role 
of CCTs towards income redistribution.  
Moreover, limiting the beneficiaries creates an opportunity for the government to better 
focus on resources mobilisation towards these targeted people. Consequently, income 
could be redistributed from high income earners to the targeted people in a more 
progressive manner. Lustig et al. (2014) argue that both unconditional cash transfers and 
CCTs possess the redistributive character and are progressive as income redistribution 
instruments, yet they would be more progressive in absolute terms by targeting the poor 
(p. 288). In Brazil, income tests are conducted to qualify the beneficiaries of Bolsa 
Familia. People who register for this program are required to self-report their income and 
can be classified as eligible beneficiary if monthly income of each member of poor 
households is below the threshold at R$120 (equivalent to AU$51), and R$60 (AU$ 25) 
for each member of extremely poor households (Higgins 2012, p. 111; Soares et al. 2010, 
p. 174).  
The second test entailed in the CCT programs is the conditionality upon benefits, which 
means beneficiaries are requested to undertake pre-specified actions before benefits are 
transferred. The most common employed conditionality are pre-specified actions on 
health and education conditions (Fiszbein & Schady 2009, p. 57). The presence of 
conditionality implies a balance between the objectives of current and future poverty 
alleviation by providing cash transfers to the poor for their immediate consumption, and 
fostering future development through investment in human capital (Rawlings 2005, p. 
134). Brazil’s Bolsa Familia enforces following pre-specified conditions regarding 
education and health: (1) 85 percent school attendance for children between 6-15 years 
old, or (2) completing immunizations and regular health check-ups for children below six 
years old, or (3) attending regular health check-ups for pregnant women (Soares et al. 
2007, p. 1).  
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Moreover, linking the cash transfer to health and education co-responsibilities would be 
able to affect the perception and behaviour of the beneficiaries towards long-term human 
capital accumulation. First, conditionality would change their perception on the 
importance of having a healthy and well-educated future generation. It is because people 
who are in poverty tend to disregard their children’s education and health status, rather 
they focus on income generating efforts to fulfil their daily basic needs, including 
involving their children as child labour (Das et al. 2005, p. 65). Thus, providing welfare 
benefits to them with certain conditionality would, at least, affect their perception of the 
importance of attaining a good education and health status for their children.  Secondly, 
conditionality would also change the behaviour of the beneficiaries towards health and 
educational services. For instance, lack of knowledge regarding the importance of regular 
health-care check or immunization might cause individuals to underutilise the health 
services (Bastagli 2009, p. 129). Since the benefits are linked to the conditionality, 
beneficiaries would endeavour to meet the conditions by utilising health and educational 
services which are available for them, to ensure that they are eligible as CCT 
beneficiaries. In this case, CCTs work as incentives to induce behavioural change of the 
beneficiaries. 
Furthermore, the comparison between previous and post outcomes in education and 
health can be used to examine the effectiveness of conditionality towards beneficiaries’ 
behavioural change. For instance, in the attainment of school enrolment, Bourguignon et 
al. (2002) provide evidence that the share of non-enrolled children decreased from 5.8 to 
3.9 percent, and non-enrolled poor children from 9.1 to 4.7 percent as a result of Brazil’s 
CCT program (p. 18). In addition, the children’s school enrolment rate increased by about 
6 percent and drop-out rate decreased by 0.45 percent (Glewwe & Kassouf 2012, p. 505). 
On the other hand, evidence also shows that there was an increase in health care utilisation 
especially for services related to the health conditionality of Bolsa Familia. For instance, 
de Brauw et al. (2011) reveal that prenatal care utilised by pregnant mothers increased by 
1.5 prenatal care visits, and the probability of a child to receive complete vaccinations 
before six years old increased by 12-15 percent (p. 9). 
Moreover, a combination of better targeted beneficiaries and conditionality underlines 
CCTs’ role in reducing inequality. Income inequality is often associated with inequality 
in human capital development (Lindert 2005, p. 12). Thus, conditionality regarding 
investment in human capital boosts future capabilities which in turn creates opportunity 
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for a better income. Dabla-Norris et al. (2015) argue that conditionality upon education 
facilitates the poor to accumulate human capital, and dissociates their educational 
opportunities from the influence of households’ socio-economic conditions, which in turn 
leads to increased ability to deal with technological changes that directly affect 
productivity levels (p. 31). Furthermore, the effective mechanism in identifying and 
selecting beneficiaries of CCTs also leads to a progressive impact on inequality. Soares 
et al. (2009) argue that even though the ratio of cash transfers to total income is relatively 
low, well targeted beneficiaries make cash transfers’ contribution becomes important to 
reduce inequality (p. 222).  Moreover, since the Bolsa Familia’s experience with good 
targeting mechanism has resulted a relatively low cost strategy in reducing inequality, 
this mechanism could be replicated in other countries (ibid, p. 223).  
Furthermore, the ability to foster human development causes CCTs to become an 
effective means in alleviating chronic poverty. A person is said to be chronically poor if 
he has been below the poverty line for a certain period, hence there is a potential of 
intergenerational transmission of poverty (Jalan & Ravallion 2000, pp. 82-83). The 
accumulative deprivation of basic capabilities is the main cause of chronic poverty, 
therefore those who are chronically poor could not escape from their poverty status unless 
the government provides social assistance (Hulme & Shepherd 2003, p. 407). According 
to Hulme et al. (2001), social assistance aimed to help the chronically poor people must 
be directed to assist them in accessing basic needs, not only limited to food, housing, and 
clean water, but also broader access to education, health and security (pp. 5-6). 
Conditionality embedded in the CCTs accentuates the efforts in breaking 
intergenerational poverty transmission as a distinctive attribute of chronic poverty. A 
healthy and educated child will have the potential to generate sufficient income in the 
future to escape from poverty status, thus the poverty cycle will stop at parents. 
In addition, the feature of cash transfers within CCTs would also be effective to alleviate 
the present poverty.  Benefits transferred to the poor households would create an income 
effect, which is enhancing access to their current basic needs such as food, and 
subsequently, supporting for their immediate poverty relief. According to Fiszbein and 
Schady (2009), the ability of CCTs to affect household immediate consumption is an 
essential determinant of short-run poverty alleviation. For instance, by the ratio of transfer 
to per capita consumption at 8 percent, Brazil’s CCT program has been able to bring a 7 
percent impact on per capita daily consumption, (pp. 104-105).  The types of consumption 
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expenditure affected by Bolsa Familia are including food (by R$ 23.18 per month), 
education (R$2.65) and children’s clothing (R$1.34) (Oliveira et al. 2007, cited in Soares 
et al. 2010, p. 182).  
Furthermore, the development of poverty and inequality indicators has proven the role of 
Bolsa Familia in reducing inequality and alleviating poverty in Brazil. Prior to the 
implementation of Bolsa Familia in 2003, Brazil suffered with high income inequality 
and a high poverty rate. At that time, Gini coefficient was about 0.6; poverty headcount 
ratio was 12.7 percent; and poverty headcount ratio by Brazil national standards was 24.9 
percent (World Bank 2017). In addition, about 73 percent of relative poverty at that time 
was chronic (Ribas & Machado 2007, p. 18). A study on Bolsa Familia’s impact on 
inequality conducted by Soares et al. (2009) reveals that it was responsible for 21 percent 
of inequality reduction in Brazil (p. 219).  Moreover, Bolsa Familia was also responsible 
for a 16 percent decrease in extreme poverty (de Barros et al. 2006, cited in Lindert et al. 
2007, p. 116). As a result, the World Bank (2017) recent data shows that in 2014, Brazil’s 
Gini ratio was 0.51; poverty headcount ratio was 3.7 percent; and poverty headcount ratio 
by Brazil national standards was 7.4 percent. 
Circumstances needed by successful CCT programs  
Since CCT programs entail ‘two tests’ before benefits can be transferred to beneficiaries, 
they presuppose a strong administrative capacity.  Means testing is the first step to qualify 
the beneficiaries. It is a crucial process to determine the effectiveness of the CCT 
programs by which beneficiaries are distinguished from those who are not entitled. CCTs 
would also necessitate administrative capacity to monitor the beneficiaries’ compliance 
with conditionality. Monitoring the conditionality is important to ensure that the objective 
of long-term human development could be achieved. In addition, monitoring the 
conditionality is required to provide timely data regarding noncompliance, therefore 
sanctions for noncompliance could be enforced (Fiszbein & Schady 2009, p. 85). 
According to Lindert et al. (2007), monitoring both education and health conditionality 
of CCTs is routine work that involves many stakeholders such as schools and hospitals 
as service providers, municipal government, the Ministry of Health, and the Ministry of 
Education (pp. 62-68), consequently, it is important to have a federal institution in 
coordinating this process. Therefore, the government of Brazil established the Ministry 
of Social Development and Fight against Hunger in 2004, and mandated this ministry to 
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focus on the administrative aspects of Bolsa Familia (Hall 2008, p. 805). The 
effectiveness of Bolsa Familia’s targeting system has resulted the higher portion of total 
benefits received by the poorest, in which the poorest 20 percent of population receive 73 
percent of total benefits, compared to 58 percent in Chile, 55 percent in Nicaragua, 32 
percent in Mexico and 32 percent in Argentina (FAO 2006, cited in Hall 2008, p. 807). 
Moreover, as a targeted program, CCTs must be equipped by a well-defined exit rule. 
The ideal exit rule of CCTs should be able to automatically graduate targeted beneficiaries 
once they are no longer poor, or when their incomes are above the designated threshold. 
Yet, the purpose of long term human capital accumulation arises conflict of exit rule 
strategy. Handa and Davis (2006) argue that the purpose of human capital investment has 
created an additional option for exit rules, which is granting the benefits until a cycle of 
human capital investment is completed, for instance children have graduated from lower 
or secondary school (pp. 523-524). Granting a full benefit to support the achievement of 
this purpose even when income of the beneficiary households is already above the 
threshold would create disincentive to labour supply and could potentially lead to a high 
dependency to the benefits of CCT programs (Fiszbein & Schady 2009, p. 24). To address 
this issue, the government should consider to gradually decrease the benefits once 
household incomes are above the threshold, and continuously granting the benefits until 
a cycle of human capital investment is completed (ibid). 
Furthermore, implementation of CCTs also presupposes complementary supply-side 
policies in sectors which are specified as the conditionality of the CCT programs. It 
denotes a government’s commitment to develop the sectors in which conditionality of 
CCTs is linked. It is because the implementation of the CCT would be followed by 
increasing effective demand of education and health care (Hall 2008, p. 817). Thus, the 
government should ensure that sufficient supply (availability, quality) in the education 
and health sectors are available. Without an adequate supply, conditionality required by 
CCTs would not be able to achieve optimum results in human capital accumulation. 
Therefore, the IMF (2014) suggests the government to the make adequate investment in 
these sectors, although it will have an impact on the increase in government expenditure 
(p. 32). In addition, equitable distribution of health and education facilities across regions 
within a country would also essential to support the implementation of CCT programs. 
Stahlberg (2010) notes the underdeveloped health and education facilities in Brazil’s 
Northeast region was responsible for insignificant effects of Bolsa Familia to this region. 
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For instance, several indicators such as illiteracy rate, the Human Development Index, 
and the Human Values Index for the Northeast region were far below the national average, 
which in turn led to the highest poverty rate compared to other regions (pp. 3-11).   
On the other hand, international support towards CCT programs would also be essential 
to enhance their development, especially in developing countries with limited financial 
capacity to finance their programs. For instance, the rapid growth of coverage of Bolsa 
Familia can be associated with the massive support from international organisations. In 
2004, the World Bank provided US$572.2 million of loans for Brazil to develop Bolsa 
Familia, in which 96 percent of this amount was intended as cash transfers and the other 
four percent was intended for strengthening the system and institutional capacity (World 
Bank 2010, pp. 3-6). In addition, the Inter-America Development Bank also committed 
to provide loan amounted to US$1 to US$2 billion to support Bolsa Familia (IADB 2004). 
According to Hall (2008), these loans significantly address financing gap of Bolsa 
Familia since they were accounted for about 25 percent of its costs for the period of 2003 
to 2006 (p. 806). This fact indicates that Brazil's poverty alleviation strategy through 
Bolsa Familia is appropriate, thus gaining financial support from international 
organizations. 
Lastly, since CCT programs are targeting extreme or chronic poverty, they neglect the 
vulnerable groups who live slightly above the poverty line, or in transient poverty. 
Therefore, to be more effective, CCTs must be accompanied by social assistance 
programs which are focused on managing the risk of transient poverty. Moreover, those 
who are transiently poor are not necessarily facing a deprivation of wellbeing for a long 
period as experienced by the chronically poor, yet because they are vulnerable, any 
income shocks would fall them deeply into poverty (Jalan & Ravallion 2000, pp. 82-83). 
Therefore, the most appropriate strategy is to reduce their vulnerability by enhancing their 
income and protecting them from the impacts of income shocks (ibid). In addition, 
Fiszbein and Schady (2009) argue that CCT programs and their characteristic of human 
capital accumulation are not an ideal instrument to address transient poverty (p. 196). 
Accordingly, CCTs require a complementary instrument to protect the transiently poor 
from income shocks (ibid). Without complimentary policies targeting transient poverty, 
the efforts of poverty alleviation through CCTs would not be able to cease or reduce 
poverty significantly. Because there would be individuals falling into chronic poverty 
caused by income shocks experienced by the vulnerable groups. 
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Conclusion 
In conclusion, Brazil’s experience with the CCT program, namely Bolsa Familia is 
evidence that CCTs are an effective means to alleviate poverty and reduce inequality. 
CCTs are also an effective means to deal with chronic poverty since CCTs accentuate the 
importance of human capital accumulation, which in turn become an effective instrument 
to break the intergenerational transmission of poverty. Yet, several conditions have to be 
fulfilled to achieve CCTs’ objectives regarding poverty and inequality. A strong 
administrative capacity, clear exit rule and adequate supply on the sectors related to the 
conditionality would be essential to enhance the effectiveness of CCTs. Moreover, the 
support from international organizations would be essential to deal with limited budgets 
to finance the CCT programs as well as to strengthen institutional capacity. Finally, CCTs 
require a complementary social insurance instrument to cover the individuals who live 
slightly above the poverty line.  
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